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Support for smallholder farmers in
South Africa: Challenges of scale
and strategy
Michael Aliber & Ruth Hall
The South African Government aims to expand the smallholder sector as part of its broader job
creation strategy. However, research shows that government attempts to support smallholder
farmers have generally been costly and ineffective. Using secondary data and case study
evidence, this study investigated the problems of supporting this sector. One finding is that
while budgetary allocations to the sector have increased impressively over the last decade and
a half, the distribution and use of these resources are such that few farmers benefit and the
overall impact is small. A strategic choice has to be made between two strategies: supporting a
few selected farmers to become large-scale commercial farmers (‘accumulation for the few’), or
supporting a large number and helping them to increase and diversify their produce so as to
become sustainable commercial smallholders (‘accumulation from below’). Past experience and
a new national initiative favour the latter, using geographically targeted generic support services.
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1. Introduction
For much of the post-apartheid era, government has tended to make broad statements about
its policy objectives for small-scale farmers. For example, the 2001 Strategic Plan for
South African Agriculture, which until recently effectively served as government’s
primary statement on agrarian reform, posited a vision of a ‘united and prosperous
agricultural sector’ and went on to define this vision as a ‘unified sector served by a
unimodal policy framework designed to bridge the inherent dualism and to maximise
the contribution of the sector to economic growth and development’ (NDA, 2001:3).
To the extent that there has been a particular bias in policy regarding small-scale farmers,
it has been to help them to expand and commercialise. This underpins the tendency in the
Strategic Plan and elsewhere to refer to smallholder black farmers as ‘emerging’ farmers;
the implication being that they are bona fide farmers only in so far as they begin to
resemble large-scale white commercial farmers, and thus will the ‘inherent dualism’
be healed. According to the Strategic Plan, achieving this implies ensuring ‘equitable
access’, for want of which small-scale black farmers have been unable to compete
with established commercial farmers. While the existence of subsistence and
smallholder farmers is acknowledged, not least because they underscore the
importance of agriculture as a sector, they are often valued only as being the nursery
from which successful commercial farmers will ‘emerge’.
It appears to be in reaction to the two bouts of food price inflation since 2000 that small-
scale and subsistence farmers are receiving more recognition in their own right. The
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African National Congress’s resolution on ‘rural development, land reform and agrarian
change’, adopted at its 52nd National Conference in Polokwane in 2007, highlighted the
importance of household food production, and the Department of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries, in the foreword to its 2010/11 strategic plan, has usefully clarified its
objectives by disaggregating the sector into ‘subsistence’, ‘smallholder and
‘commercial’ farmers (DAFF, 2010:2). Increasingly, ‘smallholders’ are taking centre
stage. (For the purposes of this article, the term ‘small-scale farmers’ includes
subsistence and smallholder farmers.)
More recently, under the ‘Outcomes’ approach adopted by the Zuma administration,
government committed itself to expanding the smallholder sector from 200 000 to
250 000 by 2014 (The Presidency, 2010), while under the New Growth Path compiled
by the Economic Development Department, it has committed itself to expanding it to
500 000 smallholders by 2020 (EDD, 2010).
How are these ambitious targets to be met?
This article reflects on the challenge of meeting these targets, meaning not just achieving
the numbers, but doing so in terms of a strategy that takes seriously the desired
socioeconomic benefits of a larger, more prosperous small-scale farming sector. This
challenge must be seen in the context of the general failure of government attempts to
reach ‘the masses’ through economic interventions, as a TIPS (Trade & Industrial
Policy Strategies) overview points out:
While government performance in relation to the delivery of social services
such as grants and basic services has been significant and at a scale that has
had measurable impacts on poverty, the modest scale of outreach of the
economic programmes . . . is striking. While some 12 million people have
been identified as broadly within the second economy, many programmes
. . . struggle to reach 50,000 people . . . Many programmes are limited to a
project level, without managing to unlock the significant power of
government to impact at a wider societal level. (Philip & Hassen, 2008:20)
This paper looks at how this generic challenge of achieving scale in our social and
economic programmes manifests in the area of agriculture. Without delving into all
the pressing issues that are of relevance to the small-scale farming sector (finance,
marketing strategies, irrigation, etc.), it analyses the level of public resources
available to support small-scale farmers, how these funds are spent, and who is
reached, and on this basis proposes a set of options to be taken in the future to
achieve scale and impact.
2. Public expenditure to support small-scale farmers: Trends and incidence
The amount of money spent by the government on the agricultural sector has grown
impressively since the mid-1990s. Figure 1 illustrates this using three different
measures. The first two, the top two lines in the graph, use data from the National
Treasury’s annual Budget Review, both inclusive and exclusive of land reform, to
show the consolidated national and provincial expenditure on ‘agriculture, forestry
and fisheries’. The third measure, the lowest line in the graph, uses the provincial
agriculture departments’ expenditure. The difference between the consolidated
expenditure series and the provincial agriculture expenditure series is because the
former includes expenditure by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
(DAFF), and by the Agricultural Research Council and other national-level parastatals.
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To the left of the vertical line, the data points represent expenditure, while to the right
they represent the medium-term budget estimates. The data have been adjusted for
inflation (and for anticipated inflation) using the consumer price index. Thus, the
upward trend is real – between 1996/97 and 2009/10, the annual consolidated
expenditure on agriculture increased by about 150%, and by 73% when land reform is
excluded. Similarly, over this period the annual expenditure by the provincial
agriculture departments increased by about 49%. Notwithstanding the dip between
2007/08 and 2009/10, and bearing in mind that the projected increase from 2010/11
to 2012/13 may not happen, the increase is still significant. However, the share of the
total government budget that went to agriculture in 2008/09 was only 2.3%, far short
of the African Union’s Maputo Protocol benchmark of 10%.
Although the increases are certainly significant, do these expenditure levels constitute
‘a lot’? One way to put the figures in perspective is simply to divide them by the
number of small-scale farmers. Given that there is little direct support to white
commercial agriculture, the focus is on the number of black farming households, an
estimate of which can be derived from Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force
Survey (LFS) (Stats SA, 2002, 2006, 2007) and from the General Household Survey
(GHS) of 2009 (Stats SA, 2010). Using provincial agriculture expenditure, the
estimated expenditure per ‘agriculturally active black household’ was over R2500 in
2009/10, a real increase of 43% from the figure for 2001/02. Given that, as of
2009, there were almost 2.6 million black farming households, this is no small
achievement. Moreover, given that the vast majority of black farming households
practice subsistence farming, a per-household expenditure of a few thousand rand
seems reasonable; it is considerably more than most such households spend on
inputs in a typical year.
Figure 1: Agricultural sector expenditure/budget in constant 2010 rand, 1996/97–
2012/13
Sources: Department of Finance (1999), National Treasury (2003, 2006, 2008, 2009,
2010), authors’ own calculations.
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However, what is known about the actual distribution of this expenditure among
farmers? An answer to this question can be found by estimating from GHS 2009 –
apparently the first national survey to ask questions about different forms of
agricultural support – the number of farmers deriving direct agricultural support.
(Until 2007, the LFS asked questions about participation in agriculture, but not about
support services. Stats SA’s Rural Survey of 1997 is the only other large-scale survey
that asked questions about agricultural support, but it was administered only in ex-
Bantustans, and enquired only about a very limited range of types of support.) Table 1
shows the numbers of agriculturally active black households receiving various forms
of agricultural support in the 12 months before October 2009 (when the fieldwork for
this study was done), and also the percentages that these constitute of the total number
of agriculturally active black households. The bottom row shows the number of
households that received any of the support services listed above, to arrive at a
consolidated estimate of the number and share of black farming households that
received at least some support. The two columns on the right show the numbers and
percentages of households receiving support services, but focusing only on those
households that were ‘commercially oriented’, which are defined here as those
households that indicated that at least half of their agricultural production is sold
rather than consumed by the household.
The overall impression created by the table is that access to agricultural support is
extremely limited. Apart from access to livestock health services, the picture is quite
sobering. Arguably of greatest concern is the extremely small share of agriculturally
active households that received training or extension; however, here it must also be
acknowledged that the wording of the GHS questionnaire was flawed, in that it asked









support in previous year
Number Sharea Number Shareb
Training 50 806 1.9% 18 548 13.5%
Visits from extension officers 47 077 1.8% 14 505 10.6%
Grants 5 236 0.2% 1 284 0.9%
Loans 3 822 0.1% 1 049 0.8%
Inputs as part of a loan 7 752 0.3% 3 728 2.7%
Inputs for free 52 377 2.0% 9 168 6.7%
Livestock health services 262 568 10.0% 29 902 21.8%
Other 1 773 0.1% 278 0.2%
Any one or more of the above 339 805 12.9% 47 676 34.8%
Source: Stats SA (2010).
Notes: The GHS for 2009 had a total sample of about 25 300 black households. Of these, 5700 could be
classified as ‘agriculturally active’ and 290 as ‘commercially oriented’. Using the GHS weights, these two
subsamples extrapolate to 2.6 million and 140 000 households, respectively. aAs share of all agriculturally
active black households. bAs share of all commercially oriented agriculturally active black households.
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only about ‘visits from extension officers’, whereas in reality farmers’ encounters with
extension officers can occur in different places.
For commercially oriented black farming households, the situation is somewhat better, as
one might have expected. However, it is still far from encouraging – only one third of
these households received any form of direct agricultural support service in the 12-
month period ending October 2009.
The table obliges us to reconsider our interpretation of the expenditure. Although public
expenditure on agriculture has risen significantly over the last decade and a half, and
even though this expenditure appears to be ample relative to the number of
agriculturally active households, in fact very few of these households are receiving
direct support. The resources appear to be available, but only a small share of the
households are benefiting from them. Why is this happening?
3. Perspectives on the underperformance problem
How can it be that such substantial sums of money are spent on supporting farmers, and
yet the incidence of benefits is so slight? This section suggests some partial answers.
Broadly, the argument that follows is that the government departments responsible for
supporting farmers are making poor use of the resources at their disposal, do not have
an adequate appreciation of their clientele, and prioritise avoiding underspending over
having a broad impact.
3.1 Lack of resources and/or money sinkholes?
It is common cause that the agricultural support services are stretched. The inadequacy of the
provinces’ extension services is a central aspect of this more general problem. In recognition
of the severity of the problem, in 2007/08 the National Department of Agriculture (NDA)
initiated the Extension Recovery Plan (NDA, 2008). A former Minister of Agriculture and
Land Affairs said it had been determined that there was ‘understaffing by up to 5490
extension officers and a need to intensify training and visibility of our extension services’
(Xingwana, 2008). Accordingly, extra resources of some R500 million were pledged over
the three-year Medium-Term Expenditure Framework period.
While this is laudable and necessary, the first thing to recognise is that R500 million is a
small amount of money compared with what is already spent on the salaries of provincial
agriculture personnel. Split over three years, it represents only 5% of the annual salary
bill for provincial agriculture, and this does not take into account the fact that the
money is not meant only or even mainly as a resource with which to hire more
extension officers. Second, even if it was possible to hire another 5490 extension
officers, this would require tripling the current size of the extension corps. Everything
else being held equal, this would enable 5.4% of black farmers to receive attention as
opposed to only 1.8%. While this would represent a massive improvement, it would
be a fairly insignificant one considering the scale of the need. As the Plan and
subsequent statements indicate, it is a question not merely of the ratio of extension
officers to farmers but also of choosing the right methodologies and tools. However, it
is not clear that government is moving decisively in that direction. And third, when it
comes to the provincial agriculture departments’ collective annual salary bill of R3.3
billion, it is not even clear where this goes. This amount of money is vastly in excess
of what is necessary to employ the country’s extension officers (approximately 2000
to 2500 people). How can one reconcile these pieces of information?
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One way to get to grips with this anomaly is to consider each province’s number of
‘genuine’ extension officers relative to its total staff complement. Such a comparison
is offered for 2007 in Figure 2. While this comparison is not meant to imply that there
is no rationale for having non-extension personnel, given the supposed centrality of
extension services to the functions of provincial agriculture departments, the picture
that emerges is deeply worrying. One interpretation is that provincial agriculture
departments have never fully succeeded in reducing the number of ‘supernumeraries’
(staff in excess of requirements) who were typically inherited from the apartheid-era
homeland agriculture departments. Indeed, while in the mid-1990s the problem of
supernumeraries was widely acknowledged, and there does appear to have been
improvement (e.g. between 2002 and 2010 the collective personnel of the provincial
agriculture departments declined by 26%), at present little is being said publicly about
the large remaining burden on provincial agriculture budgets. For example, the
question of supernumeraries is mentioned in neither the agriculture department’s
Strategic Plan 2010/2011 (DAFF, 2010), nor any of the recent provincial agriculture
budget votes, nor even the national Department of Agriculture’s 2008 strategy for
‘recovering’ agricultural extension (NDA, 2008). In any event, while it is not possible
to determine precisely what share of the non-extension personnel are in fact
supernumeraries, the authors surmise that this share is large, and that the presence of
large numbers of supernumeraries has enormous implications for the ability of
provincial agriculture departments to perform their core functions.
3.2 Most black farmers are invisible
One reason why so few black farmers receive support appears to be that agricultural
departments are unaware they exist. Ironically, this is well illustrated by reference to
DAFF’s recent attempt to make farmers more visible. In 2008, DAFF launched a pilot
Figure 2: Extension staff and total staff complements, by province
Sources: ∗NDA (2008). ∗∗National Treasury (2009).
Support for smallholder farmers 553
study for its Farmer Register Project. The overall objective of the initiative is to create a
complete database of farmers, presumably to correct for the fact that Stats SA’s
agricultural censuses focus only on large-scale commercial farmers, most of whom are
white. The DAFF report says that:
The main aim of the larger study, i.e. the Farmer Register, is to establish up-
to-date statistics of all agricultural producers in South Africa. The register
will enable the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF)
and other institutions to have accurate statistics of both existing
commercial and emerging agricultural producers in the country. (2009:1,
own emphasis)
The pilot study focused on Capricorn District Municipality, Limpopo. As per the
proposed strategy for the ‘larger study’, extension officers played a key role in helping
identify the farmers: ‘Data collectors/enumerators were accompanied by extension
officers to each farming unit’ (DAFF, 2009:2). To be clear, the purpose of the pilot
was not merely to test the questionnaire, but to test the efficacy of the methodology,
through which a complete register of farmers is meant to be established. It is therefore
significant that the total number of black farmers established by the pilot was 919, of
whom 133 were ‘commercial’ and 786 ‘subsistence’. By contrast, according to the
Labour Force Survey of March 2007 (Stats SA, 2007), there were about 293 000
black individuals engaged in farming in Capricorn, of whom about 21 000 were
commercially oriented (i.e. they produced mainly for income-earning purposes).
While the LFS data are not particularly reliable at district level – for example,
according to the March 2006 LFS there were ‘only’ 254 000 black individuals
engaged in farming in Capricorn – they provide a reasonable order-of-magnitude
estimate. The difference between a figure of 919 and 293 000 is almost unbelievable.
If DAFF was concerned about the efficacy of its methodology, it gave no hint of this
in its report.
The point is not to criticise the Register initiative, whose intentions are worthwhile and
whose shortcomings are understandable. (Perhaps it is no coincidence that the ratio of
919 to 293 000 is very roughly the same as the share of agriculturally active black
households in Limpopo that, according to the GHS 2009, had had contact with an
extension officer in the previous year.) Rather, the point is that our agricultural
support services do not appear to be attuned to the reality around them, perhaps
because their inadequate capacity hinders them.
3.3 A preference for quality over quantity, or an attempt to reduce
underspending?
In February 2008 the then national Department of Agriculture (NDA) briefed the
agricultural portfolio committee regarding the Comprehensive Agricultural Support
Programme (CASP). CASP originated from the 2003 intergovernmental fiscal review
of agriculture – conducted by the National Treasury together with the Minister and
MECs1 – which found that agriculture was under-funded, and in particular suffered
from a gap in capital funding. CASP was launched in 2004. While it was not the
largest form of agricultural support, it quickly became the most significant capital
budget line potentially available to small-scale black farmers.
1Members of the (provincial) executive council, i.e. provincial ministers.
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In the course of his presentation, the NDA official noted that, despite its budget growing
significantly over the previous few years, CASP continued to benefit more or less the
same number of people. He explained thus:
The budget of CASP has been growing. What that means is that when
CASP started in 2004/05, we had a lot of small projects, but today the
budget has almost doubled and the number of beneficiaries and the
number of projects have not changed. That means we are getting deeper
in terms of how we support the projects, but again projects have become
larger, and the quality of our investment has improved over the years.
(PMG, 2008)
While it stands to reason that concentrating resources on smaller numbers of
beneficiaries and projects is a means of improving the ‘quality’ of those particular
projects, it is obviously at the expense of reaching larger numbers of farmers. (Recall
Table 1 above, which shows that the share of agriculturally active black households
that reported receiving agricultural ‘grants’ in the previous year was about 0.2%.)
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that improving project quality was not
necessarily the main rationale for the trend towards a few large projects rather than
many small ones. According to one provincial official responsible for the
implementation of CASP, a primary consideration was to reduce underspending:
There’s no cap on individuals — they can get anything from R20 000 up to
R9 million — there are no guidelines. We got a lot of flak for that. We have
had about 120 to 130 projects in the Eastern Cape, so the policy being pushed
from national is to cut down projects, maybe to just six for the province, or
one per municipality, in order to speed up administration. To administer R10
is as much as to administer R10 million, so we are meant to do fewer, bigger
projects. The more projects you have, the more work you have. (Provincial
Department of Agriculture manager interview, 2009, quoted in Hall &
Aliber, 2010:16)
Similar tensions are observable in other developmental endeavours, such as land
redistribution and lending to support small-scale enterprise. The trend in land
redistribution over the period 1995 to 2008 was to make far larger, far fewer grants for
land acquisition (Aliber & Hall, 2010). The bureaucratic impetus to reduce
underspending is understandable – unspent government resources represent benefits that
are not being enjoyed by people on the ground. Underspending also means that future
budgets are likely to be cut in line with what was actually spent in previous years. The
irony, however, is that as programmes are modified to reduce underspending, the
ultimate consequence is that even fewer people benefit than before. Moreover, there is
little evidence to suggest that more spending on a project means a better project.
4. Lessons from the past
There have been various programmatic attempts in the distant and recent past to support
small-scale farmers. In this section we briefly describe two: the Farmer Support
Programmes, which from the late 1980s attempted to provide holistic support to
farmers in the various homelands, and the Massive Food Production Programme,
initiated in the Eastern Cape in 2003 in an attempt to dramatically increase land use
and agricultural production there.2
2This section is largely adapted from Aliber & Hall (2010:16–17).
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4.1 The Farmer Support Programmes
In the mid-1980s, the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) introduced its
Farmer Support Programmes (FSPs). At the time, the approach was novel in the South
African context, in that it focused on supporting smallholders in the homeland areas,
as opposed to the more costly and poorly performing large capital-intensive homeland
schemes such as the state-run and parastatal-run farms. The DBSA defined a farmer as
anyone who used resources part-time or full-time to produce agricultural goods. The
overall development objective of the FSPs was ‘promotion of structural change away
from subsistent agricultural production to commercial production by providing
comprehensive agricultural support services and incentives to existing farmers’ (Van
Rooyen, 1995:6).
After a mid-term evaluation this objective was redefined in 1989 to focus on providing
farmer access to support services over a wide base. The FSPs ran between 1987 and
1993, focusing on the supply of inputs and capital to farmers, mechanisation services,
marketing services, training and extension, and research. The DBSA estimated that
the project reached 25 000 smallholders through 35 FSPs before it was overtaken by
the demise of the homelands and their reintegration into the nine provinces which
emerged from the new democratic dispensation in 1994.
Hayward & Botha (1995) identified a range of problems associated with the extension,
training and research services provided as part of the FSPs, such as poor training of
extension staff, lack of inter-agency coordination, excessive use of purchased inputs
and consequent indebtedness. Most of the problems appear to have been the typical
shortcomings associated with rendering support to smallholders, and in fact many are
still very much part of the domestic landscape. A critique from a different perspective
was offered by Sender, who argued that ‘even if the programme was extended to a
level which is almost certainly not fiscally sustainable, you would only be reaching a
tiny proportion of either the rural population or those who see their future in farming’
(1995:254).
Partly on the basis of Sender’s critique, the FSPs earned the reputation of being
extravagantly expensive. Based on figures presented by Van Rooyen, the cost per
farmer was about R25 000 over a five or six year period, expressed in 2008 rand (Van
Rooyen, 1995). Compared to schemes such as CASP, this seems exceedingly modest.
However, it is approximately twice what is currently spent (on average) on each black
farming household by the provincial agriculture departments, and is thus clearly
unaffordable on a national scale.
Although the FSPs recognised that black farmers encountered a range of obstacles to
improved production and market access (Van Rooyen, 1995), they aimed to improve
production without substantially altering the institutional and market context in which
this production occurred. Participants in the FSPs competed for market access with
their white counterparts who, because of substantial subsidisation, were able to
undercut them (Fischer & Vink, 1995). It has also been argued that the FSPs were
characterised by a top-down process of development planning, in practice sacrificed
their purported commitment to gender equality, and failed to explore options for high-
value crops and post-harvest value-adding (Cooper, 1995). They did not target the
poorest households or women, but also did not target those households with the
resources to expand production, and so fell between two stools – achieving objectives
neither of improved welfare nor increased output (Sender, 1995).
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4.2 Siyakhula/Massive Food Production Programme
The Siyakhula (Xhosa – ‘We grow’)/ Massive Food Production Programme (MFPP)
was launched in the Eastern Cape in 2003 with the aim of promoting successful black
commercial farmers in the province’s ex-Bantustan areas. This Programme operates
by providing state funds for grants and loans to participants and scaling the grants
down over a four-year period, as follows: 100% in Year One; 75% in Year Two; 50%
in Year Three; and to 25% in Year Four (ECPG, 2008). Despite widespread interest,
delays in disbursing funds led to low uptake, and in subsequent years high debt levels
contributed to farmers choosing to exit or be excluded. The Programme was
successful in bringing about significant improvements in yields – from an average of
1 to 3.75 tonnes per hectare – but from a diminishing core of farmers shouldering
rising levels of debt and risk that proved to be unsustainable in many instances
(GRAIN, 2008; Tregurtha, 2008). A key lesson has been the need to replicate and
scale up its ‘value-chain’ approach to restructuring, by intervening in up- and
downstream industries, which in principle could support the development of local
service and input supply industries (Nilsson & Karlsson, 2008). Apart from the
problem of excessive debt (which is reminiscent of the FSPs), a major concern
expressed about the MFPP was the requirement that smallholders form themselves
into groups for the sake of creating larger, contiguous blocks of fields. This has been
acknowledged by the Eastern Cape’s Department of Agriculture and Rural
Development in its most recent strategic plan: ‘Massive Food Programme needs a
change of approach i.e. a shift from group farming towards individual farming with
strong support for farmers to become commercial farmers’ (ECDARD, 2010:49).
One interesting feature of both the MFPP and the FSPs is that they began with ambitious
aims, but were hampered by inadequate capacity on the ground and so never reached the
scale intended. The Eastern Cape Department has recently undertaken to increase the
number of extension officers by a factor of more than three over the next four or five
years (ECDARD, 2010:22). Another notable feature is that both interventions sought
to reinvent themselves after a short while as experience accumulated and evaluations
identified shortcomings in design. Arguably the most important shifts in this respect
were in determining who the target clientele were and the vision that the interventions
had for the target group. Together with inadequate impact, clarifying the vision and
setting priorities remains the big open challenge in the government’s efforts to support
small-scale agriculture.
5. Conclusion: Options and priorities for the future
In view of South Africa’s massive unemployment problem, government has determined
that the underlying purpose of having a small-scale farmer emphasis is to maximise the
creation of livelihoods. The drive must be to identify the sector’s potential to contribute
to labour absorption and poverty reduction, particularly in the economically depressed
areas of the ex-Bantustans, where (self-)employment opportunities are desperately
needed, and then help it to fulfil this potential.
The analysis above identifies some of the obstacles to such a programme. In view of these
challenges, what should the strategy look like?
An important element of such a strategy is to accept that the expansion of the small-scale
farmer sector should build on the very large subsistence sector; in other words, it should
promote the ‘graduation’ of subsistence producers so that they can earn an income as
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commercial smallholders. In effect, this is what the FSPs sought to do. But beyond this,
what and how?
One way to answer this question is to look at how to build on existing production and to
support the sectors in which small-scale farmers are already involved. In many parts of
the country this would mean livestock production (cattle and poultry, as well as sheep,
goats and pigs). The basic limitation of such a strategy is its path dependence – the
assumption that the spheres of production in which small farmers are engaged are
optimal, and that the barriers to entry into other sectors are prohibitive, or that there is
some intrinsic economic reason why small farmers cannot branch into new areas of
production. Many such assumptions are spurious. International experience shows that
crops mostly grown by commercial or large estate farming can be adapted
successfully by small farmers, given the right institutional and policy environment.
Tea and coffee in Kenya and cotton in Zimbabwe are among the examples of this
‘transition’ of products from the large-farm to the small-farm sector, bringing benefits
to small farmers. (However, why small-scale sugarcane production in Mpumalanga
and KwaZulu-Natal appears to have stagnated is a puzzle that requires cautious and
careful consideration.)
A second approach is to explore sectors in which small-scale farmers could
hypothetically succeed, given considerations of farming systems, input and production
costs, and agro-ecology. It has been widely noted that communal areas that are home
to many of the country’s small-scale farmers are in regions with relatively high
rainfall, yet the potential for cultivation has not been tapped. Nor has the potential for
small farmers to supply fresh produce to local or nearby urban markets been realised.
Both of the above approaches have merit. However, the authors propose a third
alternative. Instead of policy makers ‘picking winners’ by focusing support for small-
scale farmers on specific sectors, a small-scale farming strategy could provide generic
support and infrastructure in the regions where these farmers are concentrated. Small-
scale farmers are overwhelmingly concentrated in just a few districts (e.g. taken
together, Vhembe district in Limpopo, OR Tambo in the Eastern Cape, Ugu in
KwaZulu-Natal and Ehlanzeni in Mpumalanga account for about 26% of all black
small-scale farmers in the country; Aliber & Hall, 2010). A geographically targeted
strategy may provide greater options for farmers to adapt and diversify their
production, by creating generalised conditions for success.
The most fundamental political choice that must be made, though, is about the future
agrarian structure. Scenarios for the future of the rural areas, and agriculture’s future
contribution to the rural economy and to providing good quality livelihoods, can
inform policy decisions by clarifying the choices and quantifying trade-offs. A
scenario exercise undertaken by the Human Sciences Research Council, in partnership
with the University of Pretoria, illustrates the choices to be made about what kind of
agricultural growth path to pursue and, projecting the growth or decline of agricultural
employment or self-employment in these different sectors by 2020, shows alternative
trajectories for farming (Aliber et al., 2008). Two of the least appealing scenarios are
the ‘continuation of current trends’ in redistributive land reform and the ‘continued
stagnation of former homeland agriculture’. The loss of livelihoods predicted for these
sectors makes the continuation of existing policy approaches very unattractive.
However, a number of more hopeful scenarios are presented. These suggest that
substantial numbers of livelihoods can be created through a mixed strategy focused
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primarily on small-scale farming – both semi-subsistence and semi-commercial –
alongside a smaller programme capable of supporting growing numbers of black
commercial farmers.
The 2008 World Development Report emphasises the central place of agriculture in
development and the importance of smallholder-led agricultural development (World
Bank, 2007). It makes a powerful case for major investments in agriculture, including
by governments and international development institutions, demonstrating the
effectiveness of smallholder agriculture as a route to rural poverty alleviation by
showing that an increase in agricultural labour productivity is three times more likely
to raise the incomes of the poorest than non-agricultural productivity increases (World
Bank, 2007:39). The World Development Report’s rationale for prioritising a
smallholder-led path of agricultural development is that this is the most effective way
to promote both equity and efficiency in the sector. Building on its view of an
‘inverse size–productivity relationship’ – that, other things being equal, small farms
are more productive than large farms – it sets out the argument as follows:
Smallholder farming – also known as family farming, a small-scale farm
operated by a household with limited hired labor – remains the most
common form of organization in agriculture, even in industrial countries.
The record on the superiority of smallholder farming as a form of
organization is striking. Many countries tried to promote large-scale
farming, believing that smallholder farming is inefficient, backward, and
resistant to change. The results were unimpressive and sometimes
disastrous. State-led efforts to intensify agricultural production in sub-
Saharan Africa, particularly in the colonial period, focused on large-scale
farming, but they were not sustainable. In contrast, Asian countries that
eventually decided to promote small family farms were able to launch the
green revolution. They started supporting smallholder farming after
collective farms failed to deliver adequate incentives to produce, as in
China’s farm collectivization, or on the verge of a hunger crisis, as in
India and Indonesia. Countries that promoted smallholder agriculture – for
various political reasons – used agriculture as an engine of growth and the
basis of their industrialization. (World Bank, 2007:91)
Yet other things are seldom if ever equal (see Sender & Johnston, 2004, among others).
Small farmers face disadvantages in access to credit, input supply, transport and storage,
and in output markets. So while small farms can be efficient in terms of factor
productivity, they may face constraints which prevent small farmers from investing in
and profiting from production. The challenge is therefore not merely to ‘integrate’
small farmers into these value chains.
A strategy to support small-scale farmers must be linked to industrial strategy, in so far as
downstream industry procurement and marketing practices are hostile to small farmers. It
also requires that commodity organisations support small-scale farmers. Getting the
institutional context right for small farmers requires overcoming institutional obstacles
that impose high transaction costs. Both public intervention to support service
provision to small-scale farmers and collective action by small-scale farmers
themselves are needed. Poulton et al. (2005) show the importance of a public sector
role in lowering coordination costs for small farmers through seed funds for producer
associations, and support to service suppliers to provide goods and services and to
traders to provide a ready market for small surpluses. Their research shows that
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potential service suppliers face uncertain demand for their services and that ‘such
assurance is lacking in poor rural areas that have not yet achieved a widespread
transition out of low input/ low output farming unless some external agent undertakes
to provide the important missing services or coordinates provision of the missing
services by other actors’ (Poulton et al., 2005).
State support or subsidisation of service providers – such as tractor services – can enable
smallholder farmers to overcome these obstacles related to scale, as well as coordination
problems, and to act collectively to overcome high transaction costs.
A core choice then is whether to support many small-scale farmers to keep doing what
they are already doing and produce a larger share of their household food requirements
(i.e. ‘food security’ or ‘production without accumulation’); to enable a smaller number of
small-scale farmers to become fully commercial farmers and raise their output and
incomes (i.e. ‘ladders-up’ or ‘accumulation for the few’); or to support many small-
scale farmers to keep doing what they are already doing, but to increase their
productivity, scale up, diversify their products, and raise their incomes (i.e.
‘accumulation from below’).
The weight of the research evidence reviewed above shows that, while these three
strategies can co-exist, most past and existing policy initiatives have focused only on
the first two – ‘food security’ for many poor households and ‘ladders-up’ for a few
better-off farmers. The emphasis of a new national initiative to support small-scale
farmers should be on achieving scale and impact, enabling ‘accumulation from below’
for a substantial portion of the existing population of small-scale farmers. Between the
agendas of welfare and food security for the poor on the one hand, and narrow
empowerment and commercialisation on the other, this must make possible an
alternative path of widespread sustainable growth and improvement in the small-scale
farming sector, and the creation of an emerging ‘missing middle’ of successful small
farmers.
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